Translating Revolution: Hannah Arendt in Arab Political Culture by Hanssen, Jens
Ausgabe 1, Band 7 – November 2013 




“Notre héritage n’est précedé d’aucun testament”
René Char2
In the spring of 2012, the venerable Cairene magazine of cultural criticism, Fusul, 
issued a call for papers dedicated to the revolutions that swept across Egypt and the Arab 
world.3 Fusul was founded by the Egyptian writers association in 1980 and soon reinvig-
orated the Arab cultural scene through its wide-ranging engagement with global intellec-
tual trends.4 Over the years, its editors-in-chief  – ‘Izz al-Din Isma‘il, Gaber Asfour, re-
cently Egyptian minister of culture, and Huda Wasfi – made the magazine the entry point 
for a new generation of Arab intellectuals into trends in literary criticism and critical the-
ory. Translations of Walter Benjamin, Roland Barthes, Mikhail Bakhtin, Michel Foucault, 
Jacques Derrida, Frederic Jameson, Terry Eagleton and Wolfgang Iser and many others 
introduced Arabic readers to recent developments in post-structuralism, Russian formal-
ism, deconstruction, reception theory, as well as Marxist and psychoanalytical interpreta-
tions of literature.5 
Fusul had not been a place for translating Hannah Arendt’s works during President 
Mubarak’s long rule. So why did a translation of her 1963 book On Revolution get pride of 
place in this seminal issue over other classics on revolution?6 And why did the editors 
choose the 1964 translation by Khayri Hammad over the much more recent translation by 
Atallah al-Wahhab (2008)?7 Perhaps Fusul chose Khayri Hammad’s translation of On Re-
volution because of his enormous output of translations in general and his critical com-
1   An different version of this essay appeared as “Reading Hannah Arendt in the Middle East: Preliminary 
Observations on Totalitarianism, Revolution and Dissent,” in Manfred Sing and Thomas Scheffler (eds.), 
Rethinking Totalitarianism and its Arab Responses (Beirut: Orient Institute, 2012), and is accessible at 
http://www.perspectivia.net/content/publikationen/orient-institut-studies/1-2012/hanssen_hannah-arendt. 
The author would like to thank John Hayden, Mazen Masri, Mai Taha and for their help and criticism on both 
versions.
2   Quoted by Hannah Arendt in [1963], On Revolution, introduction by Jonathan Schell (New York: Penguin 
Classics, 2006), 207; and in [1961], Between Past and Future, introduction by Jerôme Kohn (New York: 
Penguin Classics, 2006), 3.
3   “Al-thawra al-masriyya: dirasat wa shahadat, 2011,” Fusul: dirasat naqdiyya (Cairo: al-hay’at al-masriyya 
al-‘amma lil-kitab), 80 (2012), 31-300. I thank Amr Said at the Markaz al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya in Beirut for 
pointing me to this reprint of Hammad’s Arendt translation in al-Fusul.
4   Sabry Hafez, “Edward Said in Contemporary Arabic Culture,” in A. Iskander and H. Rustom (eds.), Edward 
Said: Legacy of Emancipation and Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 170-90.
5   Hafez, “Edward Said,” 180.
6   “Hannah Arendt, Ra’y fi al-thawra, translated by Khayri Hammad,” Fusul 80 (2012), 175-225.
7   Hannah Arendt, Fi al-thawra, translated by Attallah al-Wahhab (Alexandria: Muntada Maktaba al-
Iskandariyya, 2006).
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mentary on Arendt’s interpretation in particular. Hammad is still revered by those Arab 
intellectuals who were active in the 1960s, and he appears to represent something of an 
inspiration to Fusul’s translation intellectual project.8
Fusul’s editors reprinted only the second chapter of On Revolution and replaced 
Hammad’s own critical introduction, with the following, brief words: “we think that 
[Arendt’s text] benefits us in our potential to achieve freedom and illuminate the evolving 
ambiguities with similarly complex situations” in history.9 In “The Meaning of 
Revolution,” Arendt sets out her ‘undisciplined’ views on revolutions. Many revolutions 
fatefully mixed equality and the social question with politics.10 Even though modern re-
volutions replaced the ancient cycles of renewal with radical beginnings they also ima-
gined returning to a better past and a more authentic order. In this sense, the Egyptian 
political theorist Mona Ghobashi asserted that “[t]he genius of the Egyptian revolution is 
its methodical restoration of the public weal.”11 What would have resonated with Fusul’s 
readers after the successful overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak was Arendt’s observa-
tion that revolutions do not necessarily start out as fully-fledged revolutions but can 
quickly become so.12 In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, commem-
orative events, reform protests or prisoner-release demonstrations turned into outright 
campaign to overthrow the regime – “al-sha‘b yurid isqat al-nizam,” in the catchy Arabic 
revolutionary refrain – only after brutal and botched regime responses. 
The event that epitomised the Egyptian revolutionary acts of defiance or spontaneity 
perhaps more than any other during the 18 days of Tahrir Square in Cairo, was the battle 
of Qasr al-Ayni Bridge on January 28, 2011 during which unarmed protestors, singing the 
Tunisian national anthem, locked arms and overcame the armoured vehicles of the Min-
istry of the Interior.13 
Many veterans of the revolutionary moment of the so-called Arab Spring can relate to 
Arendt’s warning that liberation from oppression alone is not enough to establish the 
reign of freedom. She distinguished liberation “which does not require a transformation 
of the political order [from] freedom, which necessitates the formation of a new, or redis-
covered, form of government.”14 It is this freedom that has proven so elusive since the 
overthrow of the old regimes in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen and the counter-revolutions, 
especially in Egypt, while in countries like Syria and Bahrain, the liberation struggle is 
still on-going.
Even though Arendt did not engage with Arab politics in her lifetime, she was one of the 
very few anti-totalitarian philosophers whose critical vision included empathy with 
8   Hafez, “Edward Said,” 179-80.
9   Khayri Hammad, al-Ra’y fi al-thawrat, annotated translation of Arendt, On Revolution (Cairo: al-Dar al-
qawmiyya li al-taba‘a wa al-nashr, 1964), 9.
10   Arendt insists that “violence itself is incapably of speech” and therefore inamicable to politics. Arendt, On 
Revolution, 9. Yet, “violence is no more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; 
only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether 
different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from 
oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution.” Ibid., 25.
11   Mona Ghobashi, “The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution,” in David McMurray and Amanda Ufheil-Somers 
(eds.), The Arab Revolts: Dispatches on Militant Democracy in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2013), 39.
12   Arendt, On Revolution, 27-36. 
13   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dBtYLBQPRGQ
14   Arendt, On Revolution, 25.
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Palestine and illuminated the pernicious effects of imperialism on the non-west and the 
West alike (the “boomerang effect of imperialism in the homecountry”).15  Unlike other 
liberals of her age – most notably her misogynist nemesis, Isaiah Berlin who, along with 
his loyal biographer, Michael Ignatieff, functions as a counterpoint on liberty in this essay 
– Arendt time and again stepped out of what one of her most productive Israeli readers 
considers a Panglossian ‘liberalism of fear.’16 She was hardly innocent of some of the 
condescension that so defined Berlin’s and many other salon liberals’ blindness, if not 
outsight hostility, to the world beyond European culture. Whatever her shortcomings, 
Arendt experimented, and she raised painful questions that her fellow travelers shied 
away from and that more recent ‘lesser evilists’ abandoned.17 
The Arab uprisings over the last two years appear not to have brought the desired new 
beginnings. But they have certainly severely challenged the old ways. The dusk has not yet 
fallen on the ‘Arab Spring,’ and it is too soon for Hegel’s owl of Minerva to spread its 
wings. But we can commit to the historical record the spontaneous historical moment in 
which the Arab calls for bread, dignity and social justice upstaged the lesser-evil conven-
tions in liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes. 18 Compared to the nightmare 
scenario unfolding in Syria, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions initially seemed com-
plete. In both countries’ post-revolutionary elections established Islamist parties ended 
the revolutionary moment. But since then, many Egyptian intellectuals of the secular left 
have invoked Arendt’s work on Nazi Germany to warn of the violent counter-insurgent 
measures taken by the “Supreme Council of the Armed Forces” (SCAF) and of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s subtle but systematic power grab.19 More radical activists advocate revolu-
tionary struggle against the persistence of economic and juridical violence.20 Women’s 
groups symbolically wielding menacing kitchen-knives demonstrate against an upsurge of 
sexual harassment and rape under President Mohammad Morsi’s watch.21 In Tunisia, too, 
the Islamist government has created an atmosphere of permissibility to intimidate 
women and assassinate political activists.22
15   Hannah Arendt [1951], The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1976), 155.
16   Eyal Weizman, The Least of all Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza (London: Verso, 2011).
17   See, for example, the late Christopher Hitchens: “this ongoing polemic takes place between the anti-
imperialist left and the anti-totalitarian left. In one shape or another, I have been involved – on both sides of 
it – all my life. And, in the case of any conflict, I have increasingly resolved it on the anti-totalitarian side.” 
“From 9/11 to the Arab Spring,” The Guardian, September 9, 2011. 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/sep/09/christopher-hitchens-911-arab-spring)
18   For the classic text on spontaneity in revolution, see Frantz Fanon, “Spontaneity: Its Strengths and 
Weaknesses,” The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin, 1990), 85-118. Unlike Arendt, but like 
Luxemburg, Fanon insisted that revolutionary spontaneity required meticulous preparation. See Alex Levant, 
“Rethinking Spontaneity: Re-Reading Luxemburg through Benjamin, Gramsci and Thompson,” Critique 40:3 
(Aug 2012), 341-61.
19   Mona Abaza, “The banality of evil: thinking Hannah Arendt,” October 15, 2011  
(http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/24196.aspx); Khaled Fahmy, “Weimar or 18th Brummaire?” March 16, 
2013 (http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/66962.aspx). 
20  Philip Rizk, “Egypt: The necessity of revolutionary violence,” April 7, 2013, available at 
http://roarmag.org/2013/04/egypt-violence-revolution-state-collapse/ . The impunity of Mubarak’s police 
and army was upheld by President Morsi and under the current Sisi regime, Mubarak can expect release from 
prison altogether.
21   On grassroot resistance to misogynism in Egypt, follow the group “Operation Anti Sexual Harassment” on 
facebook.com.
22   Leyla Dakhli, “A Betrayed Revolution? On the Tunisian Uprising and the Democratic Transition,” March 5, 
2013 (http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10463/a-betrayed-revolution_on-the-tunisian-uprising-and). 
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My article’s approach to the Arab uprisings takes its cue from Arendt’s account of the 
Hungarian revolution of 1956. In spite of its brief duration, she considered those “twelve 
long days” so powerful and, indeed, ‘eternal’ because they were the first instantiation of 
the very possibility of defeating a seemingly unassailable regime. Many of her emancipat-
ory concepts – such as the power of spontaneity and the exercise of freedom – derived 
from her purpose to ‘curate’ the legacy of Budapest in 1956: “This event cannot be meas-
ured by success or defeat; its greatness rests in, and is secured by, the tragedy which un -
folded in it.”23
Revolutionary Traveling Theory
Arendt’s On Revolution is controversial for its almost counter-intuitive comparison of 
the American, French, Russian and Hungarian revolutions and her embrace of council 
democracy. Arendt claimed that the French Revolution failed to produce freedom because 
it tried to solve the social question by political means, which led, like Bolshevism, to a 
reign of terror. But she is also wary of the dictates of capitalism, which went hand-in-
glove with liberalism and corrupted revolutions even as “purely political” as the American 
one. As Arendt put it, the American Dream’s “fatal passion for sudden riches” and its 
“endless consumption” betrayed the revolutionary spirit “of the founders of the 
republic.”24 
For a political philosopher who was so keen on transmitting the Western intellectual 
tradition in the aftermath of Nazism, and for whom political responsibility was so import-
ant, it is perhaps surprising how invested Arendt was in the unpremeditated political 
gesture. Arendt viewed the twelve days of council democracy in Soviet Hungary as a 
heroic revival in the lost tradition of revolutionary workers, soldiers, and municipal com-
mittees that popped up again and again in history: in Thomas Jefferson’s ward system; 
during the Paris Commune of 1871; during the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917; and 
in the central European council republics after World War I. None of these “councils had 
[any] pre-revolutionary precedent in history,” Arendt exclaimed and explained: “It is pre -
cisely the absence of continuity, tradition, and organized influence that makes the same-
ness of this phenomenon so striking. The outstanding characteristic of these councils is 
their spontaneity.” What distinguished these councils and committees was that “party 
membership played no role.”25
Many scholars have felt uncomfortable with these radical thoughts on democracy. Some 
have all too hastily questioned their validity and the long-term workability of Arendt’s 
theory of council democracy.26 Few have investigated where Arendt picked up this idea in 
See also McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, The Arab Revolts, part “I. Tunisia,” 13-56.
23   Hannah Arendt, Die ungarische Revolution und der totalitäre Imperialismus (Munich: Piper, 1958), 7.
24  Arendt, On Revolution, 129-30.
25   Arendt, On Revolution, 253, 54. Luxemburg argued that “the element of spontaneity plays such a 
predominant part [in the 1905 revolution] not because the Russian proletariat are ‘uneducated’ but because 
revolutions do not allow anyone to play the schoolmaster with them.” Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson, 
The Rosa Luxemburg Reader (New York: Monthly Review, 2004), 198.
26  John F. Sitton, “Hannah Arendt’s Argument for Council Democracy,” Polity 20:1 (1987), 80-100 is 
unconvinced by her idea, while recent critical scholarship on conflict resolution has rediscovered Arendt’s 
deliberative and agonistic politics: Alexander Hirsch, Theorizing Post-Conflict Reconciliation: Agonism, 
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the first place. It turns out that Arendt’s ideas on council democracy were translations of 
her vision of a binational future for Palestine which she first articulated in her regular 
column “This Means You!” for Aufbau, the New York-based newspaper for German-
speaking Jewry.27  Abhorred by the prospects of the creation of a Jewish state at the ex-
pense of the native Arab population, she invoked the lost local and municipal traditions of 
government, where councils would “become the sites of Jewish-Arab cooperation.”28 As 
she put it, it would have the benefit of avoiding the “troublesome majority-minority con-
stellation, which is insoluble by definition.”29 Arendt is quick to assert that this form of 
urban democracy is by no means a new idea in Palestine. She may have had an exagger -
ated view of what were clearly elite institutions. Nevertheless, municipal councils did de-
velop into effective checks on state authority in late-Ottoman cities and towns.30 The 
political experience of respecting the other’s proximity survived the Mandate’s divide-
and-rule and settler colonialism. But then Zionist “acts of terror aimed precisely at nodes 
of neighbourly relations between Arabs and Jews [in places like] Haifa and Tiberias.”31
The fact that history and international law has not been kind to Palestinians and buried 
Arendt’s alternative vision for Palestine under the rubble of a six-decades-long Israeli oc-
cupation, raises the issue of the efficacy of either violent or non-violent Palestinian resist-
ance.32 Here, I am more concerned with the conceptual question of the afterlives of ideas 
and theories once the original context and constellation have vanished. Edward Said has 
called this process “traveling theory.”33 I find it useful in order to problematize the binary 
between assimilation and incommensurability of liberal democratic models. Whether 
western pundits or Islamist ideologues make such claims, both put the uprisings into a 
place of perpetual derivation and inauthenticity.34 Days before the abdication of President 
Mubarak, I have made the argument that we were witnessing an attempt at decolonizing 
the concept, history and practice of democracy and that the longevity of authoritarianism 
was western democracies' gift to the Arab world.35 In this spirit, “Translating Revolution” 
is as much about articulating the place of Arendt in the Arab world as it is about how the 
Arab uprisings can reenergize Arendt’s work and more generally, posit her insurgent 
liberal thought against the prevalent liberalism of fear. 
Restitution & Repair (London: Routledge, 2011).
27   Hannah Arendt, “To Save the Jewish Homeland [There is Still Time],” in Jewish Writings, ed. Jerome 
Cohen (New York: Schocken, 1994).
28  Şeyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (London: Sage, 1996), 42.
29  Arendt, “To Save the Jewish Homeland,” 400.
30  Jens Hanssen, “History, Heritage and Modernity: Cities in the Muslim World Between Destruction and 
Reconstruction,” The New Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 6, ed. by R. Hefner (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 
544-548.
31   Arendt, “To Save the Jewish Homeland, 397.
32   Ibrahim Shikaki, “What is the ‘right’ type of resistance?” July 6, 2011 
(http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/06/201162895553754742.html). See also, Wendy 
Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement (Cambridge: CUP, 2011).
33   Edward W. Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 
226-47.
34   Atef Said, “Imperialist Liberalism and the Egyptian Revolution,” April 13, 2013 
(http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/imperialist-liberalism-and-egyptian-revolution). 
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Said’s “Traveling Theory” initially held that radical theoretical insights lose their “ori-
ginal power” when stripped of their organic experience, open-ended context and revolu-
tionary potential. For example, Georg Lukacs’ theories of reification and totality were an 
outgrowth of Budapest’s short-lived revolutionary democracy in 1919, a critique of Marx-
ist economic determinism as well as a battle cry to overcome class alienation. But radical 
ideas either become new dogma or end up in a foretold and reconciled synthesis in aca -
demia. More pernicious, however, was the uncritical way in which Michel Foucault’s epi-
stemological critique of power, which Said himself had relied on heavily in his Oriental-
ism, reifies the status quo. At best it “derives from his attempt to analyze working systems 
of confinement from the inside,” and at worst from the resignation to ubiquitous power of 
counterinsurgent discipline.36 But, as Said came to realize later, original theoretical 
insights can also have more radical afterlives than their original thinkers envisaged or 
come to tone down later in life. Frantz Fanon’s radicalization of Lukács’s theoretical 
resolutions was Said’s case in point. In “Concerning Violence,” Fanon declares that in the 
binary world of colonizer/colonized “No conciliation is possible.”37 The native struggle for 
recognition is a fight to the death “[f]or neither the colonist nor the colonized behaves as 
if subject and object might some day be reconciled.” 38 
Whether Fanon read Lukács or - more likely – developed his ideas of subject-object 
dialectics out of his own experience of French racism and participation in the Algerian 
revolution, his critique of colonial violence was so powerful that even Hannah Arendt 
could not bring herself to reject categorically the violence he espoused in The Wretched of 
the Earth.39 Arendt’s “On Violence” was an adjunctive to her earlier essay in defence of 
“Civil Disobedience” and generally takes a dim, Camusian view of the violence – 
especially subaltern violence – of the militant students’ irresponsible glorification of it 
and Fanon’s “rhetorical excesses.”40 She may have been blind to the structural and 
epistemic violence of colonialism.41 But she was anxious to distinguish “authentic” from 
gratuitous acts of violence. In a footnote to a passage aimed at Sorel’s and Sartre’s 
apparent celebration of violence per se, Arendt conceded that 
“Fanon, himself, is much more doubtful about violence than his admirers. … Fanon 
knows about the ‘unmixed and total brutality (which), if not immediately combatted, 
invariably leads to the defeat of the movement within a few weeks.”42
36   Edward Said, “Traveling Theory Reconsidered,” in R. Polhemus and R. Henkle (eds.), Critical 
Reconstructions: The Relationship of Fiction and Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 243-46.
37   Frantz Fanon, [1961], The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin, 1990), 30.
38  Said, “Traveling Theory,” 260. 
39   Ned Curthoys, “The Refractory Legacy of Algerian Decolonization,” in R. King and D. Stone (eds.), Hannah 
Arendt and the Uses of History: Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 
109-129.
40  Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972). Quote taken from her 
On Violence (New York: Harcourt, 1970), 20. On Camus’ influence on Arendt, see Jeffrey C. Isaac, Arendt, 
Camus and Modern Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
41   Beatrice Hanssen, Critique of Violence: Between Poststructuralism and Critical Theory (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 26.
42   Arendt, On Violence, 147. Further on, she again exempts Fanon who “still manages to stay closer to reality 
than most” from her scorn for the rhetoric of violence in the New Left.
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Arendt’s surprising generosity towards Fanon in this passage, who after all conjured up 
anti-colonial terror as an emancipatory, creative act, suggests that she cannot quite aban-
don late in life what she had held dear during and after World War II: the French resist -
ance, the Danish refusal deliver Jews to the Nazis, or the idea of a Jewish anti-fascist 
fighting force for Europe. Reassured by Fanon’s warnings after his “Concerning Violence” 
chapter that the greatest threat to national independence would be the internalization of 
colonial violence and the perpetuation of the laws of war by the nationalists, Arendt al-
lowed for revolutionary violence, as long as it remained spontaneous, ephemeral and got 
to be replaced by a higher order in which politics reigned supreme. For, as she argued,
“[t]he point is that under certain circumstances, violence – acting without argument 
or speech and without counting the consequences – is the only way to set the scales 
of justice right again.”43
As we shall see, the revolutionaries of the Arab Spring struggled against the dual Ori-
entalist stereotype of the Arab-terrorist and the docile Arab. They saw the disarming tac-
tics of their non-violent protests brutally crushed by authoritarian regimes. Their ubiquit-
ous calls of “silmiyyan, silmiyyan” [“peacefully, peacefully”) on the streets of Cairo, 
Benghazi, Homs and Sana`a were drowned out by the cavalry, artillery and helicopter 
gunships of the old regimes until they themselves had to resort to sabotage, armed 
struggle and partisan warfare. To Arendt, who famously considered pacifism “devoid of 
reality”, the distinction between the two forms of violence would have been crystal clear, 
as she tended to side with the “partisan [against] the machinery of state power.”44 She was 
deeply impressed by the résistance to Vichy France which was conducted underground by 
outlawed citizens like the poet René Char, “who without noticing it had begun to create 
that public space between themselves where freedom could appear [amidst] the collapse 
of France.”45 The tragedy of this treasure which Char’s quote at the beginning of this essay 
encapsulated – “our heritage was left to us by no testament” – was that the “comrades-in-
arms” could not take this clandestine and embattled experience of spontaneous freedom 
with them into the future. Their theory could not travel, for it was locked in the time of 
the Resistance, which only reminded the French postwar public of its shameful history of 
Nazi collaboration. 
Let us return to the place where Arendt and Arabs first met: Palestine. For Palestine 
was also where many of Arendt’s and Said’s ideas of democratic humanism came togeth-
er.
43   Arendt, On Violence, 64. See also Joan Cocks, “Imperialism, Self-Determination, and Violence: Rosa 
Luxemburg, Hannah Arendt, Frantz Fanon,” in her Passion and Paradox: Intellectuals Confront the 
National Question (Princeton: PUP, 2002), 45-70.
44  Patricia Owens, Between War and Politics: International Relations and the Thought of Hannah Arendt 
(Oxford: OUP, 2007), 17-18.
45   Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, 3.
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Edward Said, Hannah Arendt and the Binational Idea for 
Palestine
In the last two decades a number of Israeli scholars, journalists and artists have re-
covered Hannah Arendt’s work from the proverbial oubliette where the reception of her 
book Eichmann in Jerusalem; a Report on the Banality of Evil had consigned her in 
1963. In the early 1990s, the journalist Idith Zertal investigated the memory of the 
Holocaust in Israel and confirmed Arendt’s agony about how the Eichmann trial would 
inaugurate the Zionist state’s exploitation of Jewish suffering during Nazi rule.46 Eyal 
Sivan’s remarkable documentary on the suppressed/lost/hidden footage of Eichmann at 
his trial in Jerusalem, The Specialist, of 1999 is a powerful visualization of Arendt’s 
book.47 Although Sivan, too, was vilified in Israel, Eichmann in Jerusalem soon became 
the first of Arendt’s books to be translated into Hebrew.
Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin’s influential and creative discussions of Arendt’s binationalism 
and his critique of Zionism’s negation of Jewish history outside Israel have been partially 
translated into English.48 The Ottoman and intellectual historian, Gabriel Piterberg has 
expanded on Raz-Krakotzkin’s work and grounded his The Returns of Zionism in Arendt’s 
reading of Bernard Lazare as a conscious pariah.49 Recently, even the former speaker of 
the Knesset, Avraham Burg, dedicated his passionate The Holocaust Is Over: We Must 
Rise from its Ashes “to the memory of  the human being who before all of us was able to 
grasp what lurks behind the walls of fear and pain, who dared to give it an urgent voice 
and who managed to articulate it better than anyone else – Hannah Arendt.“50 
Many of these critical minds in Israel rediscovered Arendt through the work of the 
Palestinian-American literary critic Edward Said.51 As far back as in the aftermath of the 
October 1973, Said had understood that “[n]either people can develop without the other 
there, harassing, taunting, fighting…The more intense the struggles for identity become, 
the more attention is paid by the Arab or the Jew to his chosen opponent, or partner.”52 
His affiliation with Arendt was not as formative as Gramsci, Lukács or the early Foucault 
but it grew the more he wrote about Palestine. What attracted Said to Arendt was her 
pleasures of exile – to borrow George Laming’s oxymoronic book title – her celebration of 
worldiness and conscious pariahdom, as well as her reluctant embrace of the Western 
canon.  Both shared an understanding of the method of reading literature to illuminate 
imperialism. They had an abiding and conceptual interest in what Auerbach called begin -
46  Idith Zertal, From Catastrophe to Power: Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of Israel (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), and “A State on Trial: Hannah Arendt vs. the State of Israel,” Social 
Research 74:4 (2007), 1127-1158.
47   Rony Brauman and Eyal Sivan, Eloge de la désobéissance (Paris: Fayyard, 1999).
48  Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, “Binationalism and Jewish Identity: Hannah Arendt and the Question of Palestine,” 
in S. Aschheim (ed.), Arendt in Jerusalem, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 165-180; “Jewish 
Memory between Exile and History,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 97 (2007), 530-43.
49  Gabriel Piterberg, “The Sovereign Settler and the Conscious Pariah,” chapter one of The Returns of Zionism: 
Myths, Politics and Scholarship in Israel (London: Verso, 2008), 1-50. 
50  The quote is my retranslation from the German edition, Avraham Burg, Hitler Besiegen: Warum Israel sich 
endlich vom Holocaust lösen muss (Campus, 2009), 7.
51   See, most directly Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, Exil und Binationalismus: Von Gershom Scholem und Hannah 
Arendt bis zu Edward Said und Mahmoud Darwish (Berlin: Wissenschaftskolleg, 2011); also, Piterberg was 
the Hebrew translator of Edward Said’s Orientalism.
52   Edward Said, “Arabs and Jews,” Journal of Palestine Studies 3 (1974), 3.
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nings and what Arendt called natality, and they shared Fanon’s unease with the pitfalls of 
national consciousness. This unease was the reason Arendt grew disenchanted with Zion-
ism even before the state of Israel was declared, and it was the reason why Said left the 
Palestinian National Council in 1991. Her reaction to the creation of Israel – “humanity 
cannot survive the day of liberation, cannot survive liberty by five minutes” – echoes in 
Said’s powerful critique of nationalist culture:
“Loyalty to one’s group for survival cannot draw the intellectual in so much as to nar-
coticise the critical sense or reduce its imperatives which are always to go beyond 
survival to questions of political liberation, to critiques of the leadership, to 
presenting alternatives that are too often marginalized or pushed aside as irrelevant 
to the main battle at hand.”53
In his magnum opus of 1978, Orientalism, Said draws explicitly on Arendt’s identifica-
tion of Edwardian adventurers in Africa and the Middle East with pre-totalitarian mega-
lomania:
“Hannah Arendt has made the brilliant observation that the counterpart of the 
bureaucracy is the imperial agent, which is to say that if the collective academic 
endeavor called Orientalism was a bureaucratic institution based on a certain 
conservative vision of the Orient, then the servants of such a vision in the Orient were 
imperial agents like T.E. Lawrence.”54
It was in the introduction to his first book on Palestine that Said engages directly with 
The Origins of Totalitarianism.55 In The Question of Palestine, Said quoted a passage in 
Arendt’s chapter on statelessness that represents, he argued, a rare and early recognition 
in the West that the creation of the state of Israel has solved the Jewish question “by 
means of a colonized and then conquered territory.” Her quote continues: 
“but this solved neither the problem of minorities nor the stateless. On the contrary, 
like virtually all other events in our century, the solution of the Jewish question 
merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the 
number of the stateless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people.”56 
Said is acutely aware of Arendt’s own Orientalism in her portrayal of the non-
European.57 Palestinian Arabs featured as both a menace and victims in the historical and 
physical background of Eichmann in Jerusalem. Palestinians were depicted as statisti-
cians and part of the “Arabic-speaking…Levantine mob” off Ben Gurion’s stage. At the 
same time, Arendt criticized that one of the main ideological motives for the trial in Jerus-
53   Edward W. Said, Representations of the Intellectual (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 41.
54   Edward Said [1978], Orientalism (London: Vintage, 1994), 240.
55   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism.
56   Arendt, Origins, 290, quoted in Said, The Question of Palestine (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1980), xiii. 
57   Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), xix. 
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alem was to show the world “the connection between the Nazis and some Arab rulers.”58 
She could barely contain her Schadenfreude when the court failed to link Hajj Amin al-
Husayni to Eichmann, and she goaded Ben Gurion to go after members of the German 
government, instead.59 Finally, Arendt devotes three pages of her postscript to the Israeli 
massacre at Kafr Qasim in 1955. The judges brought up the sentencing of Israeli soldiers 
who had killed Palestinian families at Kafr Qasim at the Eichmann hearings, as proof that 
‘superior orders’ was not a valid defence in Israel. Arendt, who then looked into the cold 
case, contradicted the judges and exposed how Israel exploited crimes like these as em -
blems of democracy while the perpetrators were, in fact, released soon afterwards.60 
In a late essay, Said returned to Arendt’s work in an attempt to formulate an alternative 
to the Oslo Peace Process and its attendant land-for-peace, two-state solution. In one of 
the first articulations of a one-state solution in the mainstream media, Said recalled the 
legacy of “a small but important group of Jewish thinkers (Judah Magnes, Buber, Arendt 
and others) [who] argued and agitated for a binational state.”61 The first president of 
Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Judah Magnes had been a long-term critic of the Balfour 
Declaration of 1917 because “he felt that Britain had no right to promise the land of 
Palestine to any people and that their promise could only lead to the hostility of the Arabs 
living on the land.”62 He founded the Ihud (Unity) Party in 1939 which revived the bina-
tional legacy of Brit Shalom circle around Martin Buber of the 1920s and “made the Arab 
question one of the central issues addressed.”63 
Magnes’s position paper “Toward Peace in Palestine,” published in Foreign Affairs in 
January 1943, caught the attention of Arendt.64  While Arendt shared Magnes’s faith in a 
binational federation for Palestine, she felt strongly that his idea for an Anglo-American 
umbrella protecting the federation would nip the possibility of true independence and 
equality between Jews and Arabs in the bud. In lieu of Magnes’ top-down approach, Aren-
dt proposed two original alternatives, one at the imperial and one at the local level. At the 
imperial level, she considered the emerging British Commonwealth a federal project that 
could, if fully committed to equality, eventually “confront” British colonialism. A feder-
ated Palestine would be a model for a united Europe both of which would be safe places 
with equal rights and identical political status for all citizens.65 
However, neither Arendt nor Magnes could fathom the obvious Arab response to their 
binationalism; that it was a binationalism that would turn Jewish refugees into settlers in 
Palestine. Albert Hourani, the young Oxford-trained, British- Arab official who challenged 
Magnes’ testimony at the Anglo-American commission of Inquiry on Palestine in 1946, 
58  Hannah Arendt [1963], Eichmann in Jerusalem a Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin Classics, 
2006), 10. The court established that Eichmann had no such connections, 235.
59   Ibid, 13, 19.
60  Ibid, 292-3. See also Danny Orbach, “Black Flag at a Crossroad: The Kafr Qasim Political Trial (1957-58),” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 43 (2013), 491-511.
61   Edward Said, “The One-State Solution,” The New York Times Magazine, January 10, 1999. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/10/magazine/the-one-state-solution.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
62  Elisabeth Young-Bruehl [1982], Hannah Arendt: For the Love of the World (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004), 225.
63   Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis of Zionism (This Means You), 22 Oct., 1942,” Jewish Writings, 178-9.
64  Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, 226.
65   Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis of Zionism, February 1943,” in J. Kohn and R. H. Feldman (eds.), The Jewish 
Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 184-5, 336.
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made a convincing case for a single, democratic and secular state which would be cultur-
ally and geographically Arab and in which the stipulations of the St. James conference on 
Palestine of 1939 applied: Jews are granted the same full civil and political rights as 
Muslims and Christians, control of their own communal affairs, municipal autonomy, 
Hebrew as a second language, and a share in the government of the Palestinian com-
munity.66 
On Revolution: The Task of Khayri Hammad
In 1955, Nasser inaugurated the “Thousand Books Project” in an attempt to make avail-
able and affordable to an Arabic audience the most important texts in European and 
Third world culture. The project mobilized the Egyptian intellectual elite to help educate 
the masses and was, while it lasted, remarkably successful as 19th-century European nov-
els and 20th century philosophy and plays by among others Camus, Sartre and Brecht, 
were translated almost instantaneously.67 
Having established the Palestinian connection in the encounter between Arendt and 
Arabs and the “golden age of translation” in Egypt, let us return to Khayri Hammad’s 
Ra’y fi al-thawrat. This Palestinian translator’s precocious sense of equality and affinity 
with Arendt empowered him to extract the world view of the original text and imbue it 
with that of his own context. As we shall see, Hammad’s approach constituted a 
conscientious alternative to Arabic translation practices before and after Nasser’s 
“Thousand Books Project.” Hammad was a widely-respected public figure and a member 
of the illustrious group of Palestinian humanists that included Abdul-Rahman Bushnaq – 
more about this Arendt translator below; the American University of Beirut historian 
Niqula Ziadeh; the novelist/artist and Shakespeare translator Jabra Ibrahim Jabra; and 
many others. They all went to school at the Arab College in Jerusalem and then studied at 
AUB and/or Cambridge. Hammad, for his part, taught at secondary schools in Iraq after 
graduating from AUB until the British imprisoned him for his participation in the Kaylani 
coup of 1941. He returned to Palestine in 1943 to become a newspaper editor at al-Difa‘. 
During the Nakba, Hammad fled to Amman, where he found employment at the 
Hashemite court. Between 1956 and 1962, he worked in Beirut before settling in Cairo to 
emerge as a writer, prolific translator, and publisher amidst the Arabic literary 
effervescence at the height of Nasserism. He was General Secretary of the Palestinian 
writers’ and Arab journalists’ unions. Later, he also served on the executive committee of 
the Egyptian Higher Council for the Arts and Culture. By the time of his death in 1972, he 
left over 100 studies and translations of modern classics on literature and politics, 
including Machiavelli, Oscar Wilde, and Ernest Hemingway, Charles de Gaulle, 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Anthony Eden, Harold Laski and Henry Morgenthau.68
Hammad used the introductions of these translations to reflect critically on the task of 
the Arabic translator. He returned again and again to the distinction he made between 
66  Albert Hourani, “The Case Against a Jewish State: Albert Hourani’s Statement to the Anglo-American 
Committee of Enquiry of 1946,” Journal of Palestine Studies 35:1 (Autumn 2005), 87.
67   Richard Jacquemond, Traductions arabes d’auteurs d’expression française: Bibliographie – Egypt, 1952-
1989 (Cairo: Service culturel de l’Ambassade de France en Egypte, 1990).
68  Muhammad ‘Umar Hamada, Mawsu‘a a‘lam Filastin fi al-qarn al-‘ashrin (Damascus, Dar Kutaiba, 2000).
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ta‘rib (Arabization) and tarjama (translation). Whereas in the Arabic renaissance of the 
19th century, ta‘rib was an excuse for loose adaptation of the originals, Hammad argued 
that a translator was required to combine fidelity and accuracy with an idiomatic mastery 
of the mood of the original text. The central task of the Arabic translator, as he saw it, was 
al-naql, a concept – central to the Arabic translation schools in Abbasid Baghdad and An-
dalusian Toledo – which meant both “to convey meaning” and “to transfer knowledge.”69  
And this task was an urgent one. He claims in his introduction to the Eden translation: 
“In our current age, we need the transfer urgently for we are trying to travel in one single 
year where others have travelled for decades. It will be enough only if we aspire to all the 
achievements of the civilized nations.”70 Expressions like these bore both the scars of colo-
nial belatedness and the impatient optimism of decolonization. 
Hammad introduction to the Arendt translation reveals little about the commission of 
the work other than that this translation was intended as part of the series kutub siy-
asiyya, in which “we translate into Arabic key theoretical books from around the world 
that delve into the treasures of history and the depth of human experience, however great 
our disagreements with the content might be.” Throughout the text, Hammad voiced his 
disapproval of Arendt’s uncritical view of the West in general and the United States in 
particular. Yet, he was impressed by what he considered Arendt’s fair, subtle and meticu-
lous treatment of revolutions. He credits the book with the rare gift of bridging the “deep 
divide between the traditional bourgeois- and the progressive socialist world.” For there 
is, he continues, “nothing that links them except a small isthmus of liberal thought… in 
the new sense of liberalism of being free of the shackles of dogmatism whether on the 
right or the left.”71
Hammad tried to counter the spectre of derivative and dependent emancipation by in-
voking the concept of ta‘rib – Arabization. As he sees it, unlike a translator, an Arabizer 
would write back at the Western author and would pick up on Eurocentric assumptions in 
the original text, in a sort of contrapuntal approach to translation. Hammad’s mantra is in 
evidence in the footnotes to his translation of Arendt’s On Revolution. Hammad’s extens-
ive footnotes turn the book into a virtual conversation between two ideologically opposed 
thinkers at a shared moment in world history. In his one hundred footnotes to the trans-
lation he criticized, from a socialist or an anti-colonial perspective, this or that point of 
Arendt’s unorthodox analysis. This practice may not meet the aesthetic standards of some 
translation theorists and may, indeed, not work in fiction where it may obstruct the intim-
acy of the source. But Hammad managed to surrender his Arabic to the particular tone of 
the original English while endowing his footnotes with the very kind of agonistic approach 
to politics that Arendt has preached in On Revolution and elsewhere.72
Both Arendt and Hammad abhorred – for different reasons – reducing liberalism to 
economics, and both believed in the positive potential of revolution, but from diametric-
69  Sulayman al-Bustani [1904], Ilyadh Humirus, mu’araba izman wa ‘alayha sharh tarikhi adabi (Beirut: Dar 
al-Ma’rifa, 1977), 25-6, 66-7, 68-106.
70   Ahmad Hassan Hamid, “Khayri Hammad ra’id al-tarjama fi al- ‘asr al-hadith,” n. d., n. p. 
(http://scholar.najah.edu/sites/scholar.najah.edu/files/conference-paper/khairi-hamad-pioneer-
translation-modern-age.pdf) last accessed November 8, 2012.
71   Hammad, Ra’y fi al-thawrat, 5.
72   Dana Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror; Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Princeton: PUP, 1999), 
107-127.
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ally opposed positions. Arendt’s preceding two works, The Human Condition and 
Between Past and Future, had recovered the political thought of the Greek and Roman 
traditions for modern philosophy. In On Revolution, Arendt recuperated and redeemed 
freedom and revolution. Both ideals had been unduly discredited in the illiberal age of the 
mid-20th century: freedom had become a ruse for imperialism and capitalist domination, 
while revolution was viewed as the reckless domain of military plotters and irresponsible 
radicals. Liberal and social democracy, as well as single-party communism, were counter-
revolutionary. They all feared the radical possibility that a political space of public free-
dom could be established in which people would take their common concerns into their 
own hands as free and equal citizens. A couple of years after Frantz Fanon had famously 
warned against post-revolutionary atrophy in The Wretched of the Earth, Arendt also ex-
pressed her worry about the way all party systems, whether single or multiple, betray the 
spontaneous outpouring of political freedom during a revolution.
Recent scholarship on political theory has identified the link between empire and the 
historical formation of liberalism.73 Hammad’s translation anticipates these post-colonial 
critiques and represents the wider intellectual mood during the historical moment of 
Third World empowerment. In dozens of footnotes, Hammad criticizes Arendt’s “biases 
and blindspots.” He argues that Arendt’s comparison between the American foundational 
myth of “lovely equality” and the violent excesses of the French Revolution fails on two 
accounts. First, it is hardly accurate to talk of equality “in a country where banking houses 
and oil barons rule.”74 Second, he questions the notion that the American Republic flour-
ished because it provided material gains, whereas the French Republic failed because it 
did not alleviate poverty in spite of all its proclamations.75
Hammad defends the achievements and, indeed, the “necessity” of socialism. Not only 
have “socialist countries have been effective in combatting poverty,” he writes, but in the 
Third World where white minorities have ruled since the onslaught of colonialism, the 
time for indigenous majority rule had come.76 Hammad’s footnoted translation expresses 
the gulf of experience that separated the post-colonial world from post-totalitarian 
Europe. Arendt writes as a minority victim of the violent passions of majority rule. 
Hammad’s comments, on the other hand, represent the hope that after decades of minor-
ity rule by colonial and local elites, a revolutionary Egypt would finally emancipate the op-
pressed majorities of the population in the wider Arab world.77 Arendt’s false universaliza-
tion of European history was symptomatic, notes Hammad, of a wider Western inability 
to reflect on its limits and responsibilities. 
Hammad is also very sensitive to Arendt’s total disregard for the plight of the black and 
native populations in North America. As a displaced Palestinian and a prolific translator 
of English-language history books, Hammad was in a position both to empathize with the 
73   Uday Sing Mehta, Liberalism and Empire; a Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism 
in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and 
Universal History (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press: 2009).
74   Hammad, Ra’y fi al-thawrat, 29.
75   Arendt, On Revolution, 213.
76   Hammad, Ra’y fi al-thawrat, 137.
77   This anti-colonial conception of revolution was expressed in Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the 
Revolution (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes & Marshall, 1959 [1953]). 
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victims of the American genocide and articulate the injustice committed against fellow in-
digenous populations. Thus he muses on Arendt’s fascination with the Mayflower Com-
pact: “It is a strange phenomenon in all American writing: They talk about their land as if 
it was empty and not inhabited by indigenous peoples.”78
In sum, Hammad’s treatment of Arendt’s On Revolution elevates the translated book 
from a mere literary copy to a historical document. He produced an original intervention 
in anti-colonial scholarship. With Hammad, we witness the subversive appreciation of the 
value of utterly Eurocentric political thought by moving away from questions of reproduc-
tion and application to Saidian “contrapuntal elaborations” of canonical knowledge.
The Politics of Translation
Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought of 1961 was Hannah 
Arendt’s favorite book and the only other of her books that was translated into Arabic be-
fore the end of the Cold War and the Lebanese Civil War collided in 1990. ‘Abd al-Rah-
man Bushnaq’s Bayna al-madhi wa al-mustaqbal of 1974 was a straight translation 
without any introduction or additional footnotes.79 I will leave the quality of the Arabic 
translation for a later examination. In the meantime, the value of the text for our pur-
poses lies in the few glimpses into the origins of the project that the book’s cover and first 
pages reveal. Unlike Hammad’s independent and critical translation of On Revolution, 
Bushnaq’s was “an authorized translation.”80  Dr. Zakariyya Ibrahim, a Sorbonne-trained 
professor of critical theory at Cairo University, served as the supervisor of the translation 
project. The flap further discloses that the book “was published with the cooperation of 
the Franklin Foundation, Cairo – New York.” 
What was the “Franklin Foundation”? Who was behind it? What came to be known as 
“The Franklin Book Programs” was launched at meeting of the American Library Associ-
ation’s International relations committee and the American Book Publishers Council’s 
Foreign Trade Committee launched in 1951. 81 This non-profit project made accessible 
over 3,000 American works for “developing countries” over the next three decades. 82 The 
idea was to professionalize local publishers and distributors and to involve leading intel-
lectuals from these countries to advise and chose which books were most suited for trans-
lation. Arabic was the first language the programme targeted and the first office in the 
78   Hammad, Ra’y fi al-thawrat, 205.
79   Bushnaq had a very similar biographical journey as Hammad. He was born near Tulkaram in 1913, was 
educated at the Arab College in Jerusalem before pursuing an undergraduate degree at AUB in literature. He 
then went to Cambridge where he graduated with an MA in literature in 1937. He returned to Palestine to 
teach English literature at his alma mater before becoming editor of the journal al-Muntada. After the Nakba 
he fled to London where he worked at the Arabic desk of the BBC with many other Palestinian refugees. In 
1954, he settled in Amman to work for the Arab Bank. From the early 1960s, Bushnaq worked in various 
high-ranking capacities in the education sector of the Jordanian state. 
80  Published in Cairo by Dar al-Nahda misr lil-taba‘ wal-nashr, Feb. 1974. Dar al-Kutub no. 1870/1974. It 
appeared in the series “buhuth fil-fikr al-siyasiyya.”
81   Louise Robbins, “Publishing American Values: The Franklin Books Program as Cultural Diplomacy during 
the Cold War,” Library Trends 55 (Winter 2007), 638-50.
82  For an account by the main architect of the Franklin books programmes, see Library of Congress librarian D. 
C. Smith, Jr., “Books for Developing Countries: The Franklin Book Programs,” Quarterly Journal of the 
Library of Congress, 40 (1983), 254–265. I thank Mary-Jane Deeb for alerting me to this programme and for 
giving me a copy of this article.
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Middle East was opened in Cairo. Its director, Hassan Galal Aroussy, was supposed to 
take the “challenge of Communism [to] bookstands” in Free Officers’ Egypt and 
Mossadegh’s Iran. By the time the Cairo office of the Franklin Book Programs contacted 
Professor Zakariyya Ibrahim to oversee the translation of Between Past and Future, the 
American members of the board of directors had become disillusioned with Washington 
policy makers mistrust of the project for its local contacts and with the bad press it re-
ceived from intellectual circles in the Middle East. 
The Franklin translations of American modern classics clearly could not compete with 
Nasser’s own “Thousand Books project,” or the boot-legged Arabic translations (or simply 
the circulation of the ideas) of the Marxist-Leninist canon83; much less with tricontinental 
revolutionary texts by Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon, Ho Che Min or Mao Tse Tung.84 
Shortly before its dissolution in 1978, one board member lamented “Alas! Our, shall I say 
hidden, fight against Communism has not produced the effects we all wanted.”85 The 
Franklin project’s Soviet counterparts, too, would have considered their translation ef-
forts unproductive if their goal was to stem the tide of capitalism in the Middle East. In 
the 1960s and ‘70s, theory traveled in two directions. One the one hand, Marxist and tri-
continentalist texts traveled to the Middle East as Arabic revolutionary manuals, or Arab-
ic translations of liberal classics were read – particularly by Lebanese former Marxists – 
with a view to diagnose the internal contradictions of their societies and to account for the 
persistence of human unfreedom.86 On the other hand, many of the thirdworldist texts in-
spired the student revolutions and critical developments in the humanities in Europe and 
North America.87 
Between Authority and Freedom: Liberalism of Fear versus 
Breaking the Wall of Fear 
Two of the eight exercises that constitute Between Past and Future are particularly rel-
evant for our understanding of the contemporary Arab world: “What is Authority?” and 
“What is Freedom?” In the first, Arendt made a three-way distinction between the “pyr-
amid-like” structure of authoritarianism, tyranny – “the wolf in human shape” – and 
“onion”-shaped totalitarianism. Authoritarianism is a type of “government structure 
whose seat of power is located at the top from which authority and power is filtered down 
to the base in such a way that each successive layer possesses some authority but less than 
the one above.”88 We may think of the “gumlukiyyas” – or hereditary presidencies – in 
Tunis, Egypt and Syria. In tyranny, by contrast, “it is as if all the contiguous layers of the 
pyramid were destroyed, so that the top remains suspended by the proverbial bayonets, 
83  Fadi Bardawil, When all this Revolution Melts into Air: The Disenchantment of Levantine Marxists (New 
York: Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 2010).
84  Paul Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and 
the Making of the Post-Cold War Order (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 20.
85  Robbins, “Publishing American Values,” 646.
86  Jens Hanssen, “Reading Hannah Arendt in the Middle East.”
87   See for example, Quinn Slobodian, Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany (Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2012). 
88  Arendt, Between Past and Future, 98.
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over a mass of carefully isolated, disintegrated, and completely equal individuals.”89 
Gaddafi’s ‘egalitarian’ jamahiriyya of Libya springs to mind. Unlike authoritarianism and 
tyranny, argued Arendt, “the proper image of totalitarian rule and organization seems to 
me to be the structure of the onion, in whose center, in a kind of empty space, the leader 
is located; whatever he does – whether he integrates the body politic as in an 
authoritarian hierarchy, or oppresses his subjects like a tyrant – he does it from within, 
and not from without or from above.” When authoritarian and tyrannical rule shifts into 
totalitarianism, as in Germany during the Nazi Gleichschaltung and in Iraq during the Ir-
an-Iraq war and the international sanctions in the 1980s and ‘90s, there occurred a con-
certed assault on “the most general and most elementary manifestation of human free-
dom” – spontaneity.90 
“What is Authority?” contained the gist of Arendt’s later reflections “On Violence.” 
Genuine political power is the antithesis of violence, for if a government acts tyrannically 
and employs violent means, it commands only obedience and submission but not author-
ity. In fact, her definition of power was almost synonymous with the empowerment to act 
freely:
violence is no more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; 
only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to 
constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation 
of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the 
constitution of freedom, can we speak of revolution. 91
In “What is Freedom,” Arendt dissects the relationship between politics, freedom and 
liberation. These reflections were significantly at odds with liberal orthodoxy in general 
and Isaiah Berlin’s dominant “Two Concepts of Liberty” of 1958, in particular. The differ-
ence between Arendt’s ‘active’ freedom in and through politics and Berlin’s individual 
freedom from any political interference merits a wider discussion than I can offer here. 92 
Suffice it to distinguish his ‘liberalism of fear,’ a notion that kept authoritarianism in the 
Middle East in place since decolonization, from her spirit of empowerment, a notion that 
affiliates readily with the Arab uprisings of 2011.
In “What is Freedom?” Arendt returns to the Hungarian revolution and its politics of 
spontaneity,  as well as to the Aristotelian ideas she laid out in The Human Condition, 
namely that the essence of human nature is participation in public and political life.93 In 
contrast Berlin viewed revolution as a threat to the cornerstones of negative freedom: 
89  Ibid., 99.
90  Ibid., 96.
91   Ibid., 25 27-9. 
92   Not least because there are also so many intellectual and biographical similarities between the two; 
scepticism of reason and unreason, embrace of reality and respect for facts. For a comparison of their views 
on Jewish emancipation, see Joan Cocks, Passion and Paradox: Intellectuals Confront the National 
Question (Princeton: PUP, 2002), 71-91; On their rivalry, see David Caute, Isaac and Isaiah: The Covert 
Punishment of a Cold War Heretic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), pp. 264-71.
93   Arendt, Hannah [1958], The Human Condition (Chicago: UCP, 1989).
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pluralism and individualism.94 The Cambridge historian of ideas, Quentin Skinner, takes 
Arendt’s side in the dispute: 
“the greatest contemporary philosopher who has tried to make sense of exactly this 
[idea that] … the fullest freedom is the engagement with that life … is Hannah 
Arendt, especially in her essay “What is Freedom?” … What she says is blazingly 
paradoxical but I hope you will see what she means. I quote her: 'Freedom consists in 
politics. For the activity of self-government and the social virtues this requires is the 
activity in which we most fully realize most fully our natures, and freedom is that 
self-realization.'”95
The reason Skinner finds this formulation paradoxical is because liberals, like Berlin, 
whom he treats “with a certain amount of respect”, are suspicious of who determines what 
human nature is.96 Attempts at doing so, they claim, have led to catastrophic results ever 
since Rousseau discovered “the Greater Good of the General Will.”  Berlin treated Thomas 
Hobbes as the godfather of “nineteenth century liberalism” and his Leviathan as an insur-
ance against the “excesses of self-realization.” Arendt, by contrast, vilified Hobbes 
(“where the condition of all liberty is freedom from fear”97) in a brilliant section on 
imperialism in The Origins of Totalitarianism. For her Hobbes’ ideas were almost proto-
totalitarian for the violent way in which “the Commonwealth…provideth for every man, 
by Victory, or Death” and makes theoretically conceivable Cecil Rhodes’ desire to “annex 
the planets.”98 
According to Berlin, decolonization consisted of violent struggles for recognition; but 
they were waged merely for freedom from insult, and not for freedom from fear. As his 
biographer, Michael Ignatieff, notes approvingly, “to call national liberation a fight for 
liberty was to mistake the motives behind such colonial revolts, and hence to guarantee 
disillusion when they fail to deliver the emancipation they promised.”99  Instead, negative 
freedom was more likely to be administered by benevolent colonizers (“some higher and 
remoter group” in Berlin’s abstraction) than by self-rule.100  Arendt, too, was aware of 
what Fanon has memorably called “the pitfalls of national consciousness.”101  But she was 
far more worried than Berlin about the persistence of the old imperial ways. She famously 
lamented in On Revolution that the revolutionary tradition of the United States was lost 
not only on the “‘revolutionary’ countries in the East” but, significantly, also on the United 
States. Instead, “fear of revolution has been the hidden leitmotif of postwar American for-
eign policy in its desperate attempts at stabilization of the status quo.” This approach, she 
argued, has effectively “boomeranged upon the foreign policy of the United States, which 
94  Isaiah Berlin [1958], “Two Concepts of Freedom,” Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: OUP, 1969), 162. 
95   Quentin Skinner, “What is Freedom,” Public Lecture, Cambridge University, August 7, 2008: postcast.
96  Skinner himself champions a return to a conception of neo-roman liberty, at the centre of which was 
freedom to act independently, and which was displaced by the 19th -century utilitarian tradition which Berlin 
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97   Arendt, Between Past and Future, 149.
98  Arendt, The Origins, 139-47. 
99  Michael Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 227.
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begins to pay an exorbitant price for world-wide ignorance and for [American] 
oblivion.”102 
Even though she was unabashedly Eurocentric – more than once she worried that 
“Western civilization has its last chance of survival in an Atlantic community” – Arendt 
was one of the first liberal thinkers to admit that “American power and prestige were used 
and misused to support obsolete and corrupt political regimes that long since had become 
objects of hatred and contempt among their own citizens.”103 Of course, this critique is 
now well established.104 Mahmood Mamdani reminded us of Jeannie Kirkpatrick, US am-
bassador to the UN and architect of Reagan’s policy towards the Third World, who fam-
ously distinguished between left-wing dictatorships which she labeled as “totalitarian” 
and which required regime change, and right-wing dictatorship whose “authoritarianism” 
should receive military, financial, ideological and logistical support. 105
‘Lesser Evilism’: the American Invasion of Iraq and Arab 
Authoritarianism
In a 1964 article for The Listener, Arendt revisited her Origins of Totalitarianism and 
Eichmann in Jerusalem books, and introduced a new category of evil.106 This form was 
neither the “radical evil” of Hitler’s and Stalin’s rule – or, as we shall see below, Saddam 
Hussein’s rule in Makiya’s Republic of Fear; nor was it “banal” – the characterization she 
so controversially applied to the administrative mass murderer, Adolf Eichmann. Rather, 
her new object of critique was “the lesser evil.” This new concept was to guide her work on 
US politics during the Vietnam war in Crises of the Republic.107 More immediately, ‘fear of 
worse’ framed her understanding of the evident double standards and contradictions 
between irresponsible political practices and their philosophical justification. She argued 
that whether it was employed in foreign interventions like Vietnam or by native leaders, 
‘the lesser evil’ “is one of the mechanisms built into the machinery of terror and criminal-
ity” for it is a ruse “used in conditioning the government officials as well as the population 
at large to the acceptance of evil as such.”108
Not all lesser-evil compromises are objectionable in principle, nor is ethical maximal-
ism an inherent virtue. But as Weizman argued, the humanitarian principle of propor-
tionality, for example, while ostensibly invoked to diminish excessive use of force, merely 
102  Arendt, On Revolution, 207-9.
103  Ibid.
104  See, for example, Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots 
of Terror (New York: Three Leaves Press & Doubleday, 2004), which starts with a discussion of Arendt’s 
work.
105  Jeanne Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships & Double Standards,” Commentary Nov. 1979. Patricia Owens notes 
that “Arendt was horrified that The Origins … became a staple of Cold War propaganda.” See her “Beyond 
Strauss, lies, and the war in Iraq: Hannah Arendt’s critique of neoconservatism,” Review of International 
Studies 33 (2007), 270.
106  Hannah Arendt, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” republished in Hannah Arendt, 
Responsibility and Judgment, edited and with an introduction by J. Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2003), 17-
48.
107  Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972).
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augurs the “potentiality of the worst.”109 Such nuances were lost on the Canadian journal-
ist, and politician Michael Ignatieff, who – in the aftermath of 9/11 – made an impas-
sioned “case for empire [because America] has become, in a place like Iraq, the last hope 
for democracy and stability.”110 Subsequently, Ignatieff advocated – in a total misreading 
of Arendt’s sustained critique of the logic of ‘necessity’ and ‘lesser evil’ – the temporary 
suspension of civil and human rights in order to protect citizens of liberal democracies 
from possible terrorist blowback.111 As a human-rights champion, he naturally had qualms 
about the legality and the after-effect of this scheme. But he reassured his readers that 
this was an age-old conundrum and quickly offered up an extended manual on how to 
bring into effect “Empire Lite” with the least possible moral compunction and juridical 
resistance. The doctrine of lesser evil helps liberal democracies maintain ethicality “when 
the law must sometimes compromise with necessity[:] the suspension of civil liberties, the 
detention of aliens, the secret assassination of enemies.” Remarkably, Ignatieff drew on 
the very article in which Arendt had criticized the lesser evil doctrine, in order to validate 
it: “Arendt once argued that being able to think for yourself is a precondition for avoiding 
evil.”112 If only Ignatieff had not thought so much for himself. But he is not the only public 
intellectual who misrepresented Arendt in order to legitimize the invasion of Iraq.
Ten years after the US-led invasion of Iraq, it is pertinent to recall how one of its most 
fervent supporters invoked Arendt’s reflections on authority in the book that, more than 
any other, shaped US decision-making on Iraq.113 The Marxist engineer-turned neo-con-
servative political advisor, Kanan Makiya, is widely credited with being the first Arab au-
thor who has applied Arendt’s phenomenology of totalitarianism to Ba‘athist Iraq.114 He 
may have understood Arendt better than Ignatieff did, but he did even more damage than 
the hapless Canadian liberal.
Makiya’s Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (1989) stands as an important 
monument for Hannah Arendt’s presence in the Middle East. His book argued that since 
the second Ba‘athist Coup in 1968 and in particular since Saddam Hussein’s presidency in 
1979, Iraq slid into totalitarian rule. In his footnotes, Makiya occasionally references 
Arendt’s The Origins, On Violence and “What is Authority?” to carry his thorough docu-
mentation of the excesses of Saddam Hussein’s regime.115 But his analysis falters when he 
locates the root causes for totalitarianism in Iraqi society’s antisemitism and in Arab in-
tellectuals’ support for Saddam Hussein. No credible evidence has emerged so far that the 
regime succeeded in inculcating Iraqi society with such antisemitic propaganda as Makiya 
recorded on Iraqi state media and as was characteristic of Nazi Germany. 116 Furthermore, 
he establishes an analogy between anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and third-world na-
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tionalism and the imperialism and the pan-movements of Arendt’s analysis. 117 By portray-
ing the Arab left as front organizations which normalized Iraqi totalitarian rule, Makiya 
perverts Arendt’s profound argument that European racist discourses and genocidal prac-
tices were imported by Central-European pan-movements.
It is not necessarily unethical to use scholarship in support of an oppressed people. 118 
But no former Arab leftist personally profited so much by destroying so much as did 
Makiya who has been ‘rewarded’ with a named chair in Islamic and Middle East Studies 
at Brandeis University. One is reminded of Arendt’s distinction between “ex-communists” 
who make a new living out of their political conversion and “former communists” who do 
not seek personal, professional or political gain by it.119
Concluding Revolutions: Between Liberation and Violence
In a recent article for The New York Times, Makiya made the claim that “the toppling of 
the first Arab dictator, Saddam Hussein, paved the way for young Arabs to imagine [the 
Arab Spring].”120 Even though the opposite is probably closer to the mark, namely that the 
turn to civil war and jihadism, especially in the Syrian uprising, is a consequence of the 
US occupation of Iraq, Makiya’s narrative exemplifies the on-going hermeneutic battles 
over the sources and nature of the uprisings in the Middle East that Mohammad Bou-
azizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia sparked in December 2010. Some cite the Lebanese Ce -
dar Revolution after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri that 
ended the decades-old Syrian military presence in the country. Others give credit to the 
inspiration of the Iranian green movement because of parallels with the uses of mobile 
electronic communication devices.121 Meanwhile, The New York Times and other 
American news outlets have credited the veteran political scientist Gene Sharp’s manual 
for non-violent resistance with the Egyptian revolution.122 The “facebook-phenomenon,” 
the Arab ‘youth bulb’, the global food crisis, the Egyptian marriage crisis or Cairo’s 
housing scarcity were all part of the neo-liberal constellations that made the revolutionary 
uprising inevitable after it occurred.123 
All these causes are insufficient to explain when, where, and especially how the protests 
erupted. Many participants of the ‘Tahrir Commune’ who ousted President Hosni 
Mubarak on February 11, 2011, insist that it was the solidarity movement around the 
Palestinian resistance against Israeli Apartheid particularly since the second Intifada, the 
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protests against the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as the textile factory labour ac-
tion in the Nile Delta in 2007 and 2008 that galvanized the core of the anti-Mubarak 
protestors. These most recent events, in which 25,000 Egyptian workers laid down their 
work, were supported by social activists called “The April 6 Youth Movement” who trans-
mitted the strikes to the internet.124 It was the martyrdom of one of their own, the blogger 
Khaled Said who was beaten to death by Egyptian security forces in July 2010 that reener-
gized the anti-Mubarak protest movement. Groups like “April 6” and “We are all Khaled 
Said” emerged as tenacious organizers of the protests, particularly as they started to make 
common cause with the youth organizations of emergent opposition parties, like the al-
Ghad party or the Kifaya movement. 
But credit for the overthrow of Mubarak is a hotly contested issue in Egypt itself where 
the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood and the ruling military junta that ousted 
President Morsi in a coup on July 3, 2013 have spun heroic narratives of their contribu-
tion. Arendt’s ideas sketched above help disaggregate the long-term, structural factors 
from the conjunctural factors leading to revolt, and both of these from the forces that de-
termine whether genuine transformation, counter-revolution or civil war follows after the 
revolutionary moment. Broadly speaking, the different  trajectories each uprising took de-
pended on whether the ancient regimes were willing to use brute force for their survival – 
like in Syria, Libya and also Bahrain; those unable to rely solely on violence – like the ne-
gotiated revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and, to a different degrees, in Morocco and Yemen 
– and those oil monarchies which were able to mix violence with economic incentives in 
order to stifle dissent almost totally. 
In Egypt, the revolutionary moment occurred, because, according to Mona Ghobashy, 
the country’s “three organizational infrastructures of protest” - association, workplace 
and neighbourhood” managed to link up.125 Through a number of social media decoys and 
word-of-mouth mobilizations, the masses of people overwhelmed the misassembled po-
lice and security forces and poured into Tahrir Square on January 28, 2011. After this day, 
as the activist-journalist Ahmad Shokr recalled, “Tahrir was elevated from a rally site to a 
model for an alternative society [where] a spirit of mutual aid prevailed.”126  
In the Syrian uprising, Omar Aziz was the mastermind behind the local co-ordinating 
councils before he died under torture in Adra prison on February 17, 2013. According to 
one obituary, Aziz returned to Syria to set up alternative “networks of solidarity and mu-
tual aid” that could perform basic functions of state, constitute a clandestine space for 
‘thinking in dark times’ as well as “providing logistical, material and psychological sup-
port for displaced persons and prisoners’ families.” 127 
The striking simultaneity of the Arab uprisings carried enormous historical meaning 
and affected Arab intellectuals deeply. An editorial in al-Akhbar, Beirut, during the eight-
een days of Tahrir Square expressed how this more than any other event, epitomised the 
wholly unexpected Arab defeat of defeatism: “young Egyptians are struggling not only to 
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get rid of President Hosni Mubarak but also to restore the self and the dignity of Egypt 
and Arabs from the abyss of defeat.” Since the Egyptian military defeat in the June 1967 
war against Israel, the editorial continues, Arabs have suffered from the Camp David 
peace process, from the unfettered occupation of Palestinian land, the civil war in Leban-
on, militant Islam, the slaughter in Iraq under Saddam Hussein and under the on-going 
American occupation, and the looting of national wealth by comprador business elites 
aligned with their dictatorships. This then becomes a moment of cultural catharsis that 
has the potential to liberate Arabs from almost half a century of crippling self-doubt and 
humiliation.128 
Here our Arendtian reading of the Arab uprisings interlocks with how we can re-read 
her work in light of them. Arendt’s approach to the Hungarian revolution has provided 
the most fitting framework of analysis on two accounts: Methodologically, she isolated the 
promise of the twelve days of Budapest from the backlash of the Soviet invasion after-
wards to make the wager that the power of the idea of resistance would outlive the reality 
of the violence of the tanks. This approach allowed her to speak of revolution even though 
it was short-lived. Arendt gave an account of how the Hungarians spontaneously chal-
lenged the realm of the politically imaginable, enacted human freedom, and built new 
forms of democratic organization.
Bahrain’s Pearl Square protests from February 15 to March 15, 2011 have come close to 
the fate of the Hungarian revolutionaries when Bahraini Defence forces killed dozens and 
arrested hundreds of demonstrators, King Hammad ordered the demolition of the square 
and Saudi tanks entered the country.129 As prominent human rights activists and many 
medical staff have become political prisoners, Bahrainis continue to defy the brutal clamp 
down of their peaceful protests.130 But the sectarian counter-insurgency that the govern-
ment employed has come to characterize the way most other Arab states have tried to 
delegitimize the uprisings, raising the spectre of the Lebanese- or, pace Makiya, the Iraqi 
civil war.
Nowhere is this spectre looming more menacingly than in Syria where President Bashar 
al-Assad has warned of ten Afghanistans if the opposition won. The conflict started out 
timidly with the families of the southern town of Der‘a demanding the release of their 
teenage boys who were caught grafittying the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionary slogan 
al-sha‘b yurid isqat al-nizam in mid March, 2011.131 The peaceful mass protests that 
swept across Syrian towns and villages Friday after Friday were met with the state’s 
bullets, mass arrests and torture. When news appeared of the torture of children, most 
infamously the 15 year-old boy Hamza Ali Al-Khatib, the popular cartoonist, Ali Farzat, 
got his fingers broken, and the witty bard of Hama, Ibrahim Qashoush, had his throat slit 
by regime thugs in the spring of 2011, the demonstrators turned to armed struggle and the 
Free Syrian Army formed. Since then, the popular uprising has become a regional and in-
ternational imbroglio: neighbours, Gulf states and members of the UN security council 
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are fuelling the blazes; mercenaries are infiltrating the battle. The spectre of total collapse 
looms ominously over Syria. Today, the country is divided and the conflict is so hopelessly 
drenched in sectarian vitriol that many commentators have given up; and many on the 
left have lost interest: The Syrian opposition in exile has made too many errors of judg-
ment, the Free Syrian Army has too much blood on its own hands and the global jihadists 
are bound to reap the ruins of liberation.  
What made this revolutionary moment possible in the first place was its utter spon-
taneity and the total absence of any conspiracy, real or imagined. As this storm of protests 
gathered force, it exposed the flawed logic that expanding the realm of freedom necessar-
ily means expanding the realm of accepting Western hegemony. In fact, it suggested that 
oppressive Arab regimes sustained (and were vitally sustained by) liberal democracies in 
the West in the name of the stability of the lesser evil doctrine whose unholy trinity is oil, 
Israel and Islamophobia. One of the most striking aspects of the Arab uprisings was the 
instant move to self-organization the moment the state collapsed or abandoned its admin-
istrative functions. What started off as ad hoc public security and protection operations 
morphed into democratic forums that discussed the referendum on the constitution, ex-
changed information, ran neighbourhood elections, and launched accountability cam-
paigns over the coming months. What started as human protection and basic services 
ended up to be electoral laboratories.
Many ordinary Syrians who had gotten by under the oppressive rule of the Assad clan 
had appreciated the stability and the modicum of prosperity it provided. 132 This arrange-
ment rendered Syrian authoritarianism resilient and adaptable. 133 Perhaps the uprising 
was not worth the price of over 130,000 dead Syrians. Perhaps keeping quite after the 
Der‘a protests would have been the lesser evil.  Moreover, as sympathisers of Ba‘thism, 
Hizballah and the Iranian government insist, Syria is the linchpin of anti-imperialist 
deterrence against Saudi-Israeli-US hegemony in the region. Ironically, such lesser-evil 
logic has much in common with Michael Ignatieff’s approval for the use of torture in the 
War on Terror. It also enjoys the unlikely company of hawkish Israeli think tanks and 
notorious Islamophobe neo-cons, like Daniel Pipes, who advocate arming Assad in order 
to prevent greater evils.134 
The revolutionary moment and the radical possibilities of the Arab Spring has now 
passed, as counter-revolutions –supported by reactionary forces on the Arabian Peninsula 
– have nipped the political visions of the Cairo commune and the local coordinating com-
munities in Syria in the bud. The revolutionaries of the first hour are limited to preserving 
the memory of the early days for new generation, much like Arendt attempted for the 
Hungarian uprising. In Egypt, this work is conducted not only against the army under 
General Sisi which took advantage of the Tamarrud million-(wo)man march on June 30, 
2013 to get Morsi to resign and staged a coup d’état  four days later. The return to military 
rule was in itself deeply disturbing for the revolutionaries. What frustrated their work 
even more was the wide-spread support for Sisi in the Egyptian middle class even and 
especially after the army’s massacres of hundreds of protesters on August 3, 2013. Despite 
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their own opposition to Morsi’s politics, they, too, have been criminalized and arrested by 
a new authoritarian regime that can act with impunity because most liberal parties 
sanction it as the of two lesser evils. 
The task of upholding the principles of the revolution is even more dangerous inside 
Syria, and betrayed by the international left outside.  When units of pro-Assad forces 
gassed hundreds of people in rebel-held neighborhoods on the outskirts of Damascus on 
August 21, 2013, and President Obama threatened with US military strikes, the interna-
tional community gathered around slogans of anti-imperialism and chanted “give peace a 
chance.” Assad’s two-and-a-half years of brutal counter-insurgency has garnered no such 
outpouring of pacifism as Syrians continue to endure the lesser evil logic of Western 
apathy. The US military strikes were called off after intense imperial squabbles at the UN. 
This is celebrated as a great victory of anti-imperialism 135, even though the US military 
had no interest or paymaster to execute the threat, while Republicans revive utterly dis-
credited, Bush-style muscular militarism.136  The elephant in the room that makes it im-
possible for the global left to declare its solidarity with the embattled Syrian revolution is 
geopolitics.137 The refusal to declare solidarity with the Syrians inside Syria who struggle 
against Iran-and Hizbollah-supported regime forces as well as against Gulf-backed ji -
hadists is costing lives and defers indefinitely a political solution. As Yassin al-Haj Saleh, 
one of the many René Chars inside the Syrian revolution who are still alive to continue 
their struggle against the overwhelming odds, reminded the readers of the New York 
Times:
“In the West, reservations about supporting the Syrian rebels that once seemed 
callous and immoral are now considered justified because of the specter of jihadism. 
But this view is myopic. Jihadist groups emerged roughly 10 months after the 
revolution started. Today, these groups are a burden on the revolution and the 
country, but not on the regime. On the contrary, their presence has enabled the 
regime to preserve its local base, and served to bolster its cause among international 
audiences. It is misguided to presume that Mr. Assad’s downfall would mean a 
jihadist triumph, but unfortunately this is the basis for the West’s position. A more 
accurate interpretation is that if Mr. Assad survives, then jihadism is sure to 
thrive.”138 
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